


ISTARI Lighthouse

# Governing Amid Geopolitical Disruption and Technological Change

**Making Your Board Cyber Resilient**

Professor Lucas Kello, ISTARI & Oxford University  
Thai Institute of Directors | 9 September 2026





# Today's three sessions

- |    |                                                                                                    |        |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| 01 | <b>The Changing Cyber Risk Landscape</b><br>Geopolitical disruption and rapid technological change | 50 min |
| 02 | <b>Cybersecurity Resilience Framework</b><br>Building your foundation                              | 40 min |
| 03 | <b>Preparing the Board</b><br>Case studies and lessons                                             | 40 min |

# The Changing Cyber Risk Landscape

---

Geopolitical disruption & technological change

# A moment of inflection

## GEOPOLITICAL DISRUPTION

- Multipolar rivalry
- State cyber campaigns
- Sanctions and supply-chain pressure

## TECHNOLOGICAL ACCELERATION

- AI agents and automation
- Cloud and software concentration
- Quantum migration



**Cyber risk is no longer mainly a technical issue. It is a strategic business risk.**



# Why this matters in Thailand now

01

## Quantum-Ready 2030

National migration  
planning has begun.

02

## Cloud security standard

New national standard  
takes effect on 10  
September 2026.


03

## Direction of travel

From reactive defence to  
proactive resilience.

# Technology changes faster than doctrine

Behind many strategic failures is a bad theory of new technology.



1914

**Submarine warfare**



1937

**Strategic air power**



1940

**Mechanised warfare**



1945

**Nuclear conflict**



2007+

**Cyber and AI**

---

**Institutions usually adapt after an initial shock.  
By then, it's too late.**



# From nuisance to geopolitical convergence

Cyber threats have moved from isolated digital events to a fusion of geopolitical rivalry and technological disruption.

## STAGE 0

### Nuisance & crime

Basic malware;  
low-cost disruption



## STAGE 1

### Demonstration

First crises show political  
impact



## STAGE 2

### Industrial sabotage

Targeted damage to  
systems and operations



## STAGE 3

### Political subversion

Influence and narrative  
manipulation



## STAGE 4

### Convergence

Multipolar rivalry + AI +  
fragile interdependence



**We are in the middle of the next phase shift.**



# The fifth transition

Power transition amid permanent technological change

## 1 Return of multipolar rivalry

- Competition moves beyond military domains.
- Digital and infrastructure pressure become tools of statecraft.

## 2 Permanent technological acceleration

- AI, cloud and digital dependence amplify fragility.
- The risk surface changes faster than static controls.

## 3 More conflict below the war line (unpeace)

## 4 Private infrastructure becomes strategic terrain

## 5 Governance and law keep lagging

# A world of unpeace

---

Persistent conflict below the threshold of war—more harmful than normal competition, but short of open war.

- 01 Major powers avoid direct war
- 02 Pressure shifts into cyber, data, supply chains and influence
- 03 Companies become part of the contest

# The rise of corporate geopolitics

**Private companies often believe they are outside geopolitics.**

- Strategic assets attract state attention.
- Neutrality does not protect infrastructure, data or suppliers.
- Cloud, identity, software and logistics are now strategic terrain.



**If your business is strategically relevant, geopolitics will come to you.**



# What strategic intrusion looks like

## 1 Stealth

No visible disruption. The actor avoids attention.

## 2 Persistence

Access is maintained for months or years.

## 3 Pre-positioning

Leverage is saved for a future crisis.



### Recent patterns

Email-system compromise • Telecom surveillance •  
Satellite disruption

**The objective is often access and leverage—not ransom.**



# AI changes the offence–defence balance

1

## Hacking with AI

Faster phishing, impersonation, malware changes and vulnerability search.

2

## Hacking the AI

Prompt injection, data poisoning, tool hijacking and model theft.

3

## Hacking for AI

Steal data, logs, models and compute to improve offensive systems.

**AI-augmented threats are here. Agentic systems raise the tempo again.**

# The next wave: delegated action



## LLM as tool

User asks.  
Model responds.  
Human acts.

## Copilot

Model proposes.  
Human approves.  
System executes.

## Agentic AI

Goal persists. Model plans.  
Tools act. Human intervenes  
by exception.

Goal



Plan



Tools



Memory



Action

**Control = permissions, visibility, containment, rollback and human authority.**

# Quantum risk starts before “Q-Day”

## Harvest now, decrypt later

---

Encrypted data stolen today may become readable later.

Long-lived data creates a present-day board risk.

## What boards should do now

- Map long-lived data
- Build a cryptographic inventory
- Set a migration owner and timetable

**Thailand's Quantum-Ready 2030 makes this a current governance issue.**



# Govern in dynamic probabilities

Static maturity scores show where you were. They do not show what may hit next.

## 1 Vision

Are we looking ahead—or only reporting the past?

## 2 Exposure

Which critical services and assets matter most?

## 3 Foresight

What event would force us to change posture?

## 4 Ecosystem

Which partners must respond with us?

# What directors should now assume

- 01 Intrusion is a starting assumption of security strategy

---
- 02 Disruption can spread across the group and supply chain

---
- 03 AI will compress decision time

---
- 04 Regulation will keep moving, including into the boardroom

---
- 05 Resilience depends on adaptation before a crisis

# Cybersecurity Resilience Framework

---

Building your foundation

# Mindshift: From security to resilience

## CYBERSECURITY

- Keep the attacker out
- Protect systems
- IT-led
- Point-in-time assurance

## CYBER RESILIENCE

- Assume some intrusion
- Keep critical services running
- Enterprise-led
- Continuous learning

**Prevention remains essential. It is no longer sufficient.**



# Cyber resilience means the ability to...



## **Anticipate**

See emerging threats




## **Withstand**

Limit operational  
impact



## **Respond**

Decide under  
uncertainty



## **Adapt**

Recover and emerge  
stronger

**The goal is to master the anticipation game.**



# Resilience is built by routine

Five leadership routines turn resilience from an idea into a management system.

1

## Strategy

Critical services  
Risk appetite

2

## Culture

Shared responsibility  
Speak-up

3

## Organisational design

Roles  
Decision rights

4

## Risk & governance

Playbooks  
Metrics & exercises

5

## Ecosystem

Suppliers  
Regulators & support

**Resilience is a repeatable management system—not a one-off project.**



# HELM: a boardroom framework for proactive resilience



## Horizon Scanning

What is changing?



## Enterprise Governance

Who decides—and how?



## Leadership Culture

How do leaders behave?



## Monitoring

What does the board track?

**HELM connects foresight, decision rights, culture and oversight.**



# Eight steps for the board

1

**Understand the  
board's role**

2

**Assess maturity and  
risk appetite**

3

**Embed cyber in  
enterprise risk**

4

**Build the  
fundamentals**

5

**Secure digital  
transformation**

6

**Close capability gaps**

7

**Maintain oversight**


8

**Recover and learn**

**Use this as a cycle, not a one-time sequence.**



# Checklists are just the floor. The ceiling is higher.



**A checklist can show that a plan exists. Only practice shows whether it works.**



# What Regulators Are Worried About

01

**Geopolitical instability and state-linked campaigns**

Prepositioning for future disruption, not just stealing data

02

**Complex supply chains and interdependent infrastructure**

Regulators do not believe risk sits only within the enterprise 'perimeter'

03

**Transformation of business models and services**

AI, Cloud – services increasingly run on infrastructure the company does not own, operate or see

04

**Attackers moving faster than defenders can respond — the new pressure**

AI cuts the time to find a vulnerability and build an exploit from months to hours

05

**Cryptography with an approaching quantum expiry date**

Data being harvested today can be decrypted later



# How Obligations Are Widening and Quickening: Accountability, Perimeter and Pace Increase

01

## From paperwork & disclosure to preparedness & demonstrable governance, especially by boards.

- Raising expectations on boards, eg for critical sectors in Europe, Singapore and Australia. Directors set tone and accountability for cyber risk.
- Eg, Singapore requires critical infrastructure owners to run exercises, set board-approved risk tolerances, and train directors annually

02

## The 'perimeter' keeps descending into the infrastructure beneath you

- UK is pulling managed service providers and data centres into scope. Singapore is looking to regulate major cloud providers and data centres.
- Europe now regulates the security of connected products sold into the EU – reporting from Sep 2026, full requirements from Dec 2027

03

## Reporting is broadening and the clocks are shortening

- Reporting clocks now run in hours, not days – 24 to 72 hours across Europe and the UK, down to six hours in Malaysia and two in Singapore
- Australia requires ransomware payments to be reported within 72 hours (above A\$3m turnover)



# Deepening and Crossing Borders: From Advice to Supervision and Beyond

01

**AI and Quantum risks were handled by advisories. It is moving to supervision and obligation.**

- Europe's high-risk AI rules pushed back to December 2027, and to August 2028 for AI built into regulated products
- Singapore intends to supervise rather than legislate on AI risk for financial institutions. It expects its financial sector to be quantum-resilient before the end of this decade
- The US has set hard quantum deadlines of 2030 and 2031 for its own federal government systems, and requires a machine-readable register of cryptographic dependencies
- Switzerland expects its banks to have a board-approved quantum migration roadmap by mid-2027

02

**Technology export rules & foreign obligations go deeper**

- US export rules used to turn on where hardware shipped; new guidance is looking at who ultimately owns the buyer
- Foreign obligations can arrive through supplier contracts and counterparty requirements - before a domestic regulator does so

**Regulatory demands will generally continue to grow globally. The timeline may change, but don't expect the general direction to.**

# Preparing the Board

---

Case studies and lessons



# Worst practices: why crisis control fails

1

**No clear owner**

2

**Slow or unclear  
escalation**

3

**Conflicting  
communication**

4

**No workable fallback**

5

**Board absent—or  
becomes a  
bottleneck**

**A crisis is not the time to debate who is in charge!**

# Best-practice case: Norsk Hydro (2019)



**Global ransomware attack  
across IT and operations**

## What worked

- Clear emergency structure
- Manual workarounds protected operations
- Open, frequent communication
- Systems rebuilt from backups; lessons applied

**Best practice is not avoiding disruption. It is controlling the consequences.**

# Resilience warning: Jaguar Land Rover (2025)

## JLR

**5+ weeks** before phased  
manufacturing restart

**£196m** cyber-related costs reported  
in Q2

**£1.5bn** government-backed loan  
guarantee for supply-chain  
support

## Board lessons

- Digital outages can halt physical production
- Supplier resilience becomes enterprise resilience
- Recovery priorities must be agreed before the crisis
- Use realistic timelines—not optimistic promises

**Ask: could your business operate for five weeks without core systems?**

# Best practices when it matters most

## BEFORE THE CRISIS

- Clear activation triggers
- Roles and decision rights
- Tested fallback procedures

## DURING THE CRISIS

- Daily decision rhythm
- Fact-based communication
- Regulator and stakeholder coordination

## AFTER THE CRISIS

- Independent review
- Close actions to completion
- Update playbooks and exercises

**Readiness turns crisis from improvisation into controlled action.**



# What Thailand's Recent Breaches Reveal

3,180

cyber-attacks per week on average — around 70% above the global average

THB 21.5m

in PDPA fines across five cases in 2025 — up from near-zero a year earlier

2.2m+

Thai citizen records exposed in a set of cyber incidents

## WHAT THE CASES REVEAL

**Identity & access:** Weak passwords and incomplete MFA turn stolen credentials into primary entry points.

**Third-party exposure:** Processors and vendors extend the attack surface while obscuring accountability.

**Basic hygiene gaps:** No DPO and lack of reporting draw the largest regulatory fines.

**Readiness:** Weak detection and response discipline magnify operational and regulatory impact.

**Ransomware speed:** Attackers move from breach to encryption in under 14 hours.

**Stolen data:** Information is active and resold as a service via chat bots.

**Trust is the largest cost:** Customer and citizen confidence outlasts any single fine.

#1

**Business Disruption Risk (2026)**

Up from #5 in 2025

3x

**More Ransomware Attacks**

Affecting Thai businesses in the past two years



# New Rules Reshaping the Board's Cyber Agenda

## CYBER



Cybersecurity Act CII duties (2024): 24-hour incident reporting, annual audits and board-approved frameworks. PDPA: 72-hour breach notice, fines to THB 5m.

### IMPACT

Enforced accountability across seven critical sectors.

## AI



Draft AI Law (ETDA, 2025; enactment ~2028), risk-based like the EU AI Act. Sector rules already live — Bank of Thailand AI risk management, AI-ad and court disclosure.

### IMPACT

Formal AI governance expected now, ahead of the law.

## QUANTUM



National quantum roadmap and post-quantum warnings from NCSA, ETDA and NSTDA. "Harvest now, decrypt later" flagged as a present-day risk to encrypted data.

### IMPACT

Begin crypto-agility and post-quantum migration planning.

## CLOUD



"Cloud First" policy live 2025 via the government cloud (GDCC). Draft cloud cybersecurity standards for CII and providers, with data-classification duties.

### IMPACT

Data sovereignty, classification and vendor assurance.

### WHAT THE BOARD NEEDS TO PREPARE FOR

- Govern cyber, data and AI as one board-level agenda across overlapping laws — not separate IT projects.
- Stand up AI governance and third-party risk oversight now, ahead of the AI law.
- Rehearse incident response routines when stakes are low; embed cyber resilience by routine

### THREE DECISIONS FOR THE NEXT 12 MONTHS

- Name accountable executives for cyber, privacy, AI and cloud.
- Test applicable 24-/72-hour reporting pathways and third-party escalation. Conduct senior level tabletop exercise.
- Fund cyber resilience maturity assessment, cryptography inventory and cloud data-classification work.



# Five decisions to pre-agree

1

**Who leads the enterprise response?**

2

**What triggers board activation?**

3

**Which services are restored first?**

4

**Who approves shutdowns, payments and disclosure?**

5

**How are regulators, customers, employees and suppliers informed?**

**Board role: oversight and strategic decisions—not running the technical response.**



# **Build a Board-Level Master Playbook**

